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ABSTRACT 
Although a substantial amount of previous work has been dedicated to the study of the possible 
theoretical mechanisms underpinning autism spectrum disorder (ASD), little research has examined 
the types of difficulties experienced by individuals in their everyday social functioning. University 
students with ASD and matched control participants performed the Social Strategy task. In this, they 
read a range of descriptions of social interactions, all ending with an awkward question asked by the 
story main character. The types of strategies they used to answer the awkward questions were 
examined. Compared to control participants, those with ASD used a more negative emotional tone in 
responding, generated more simple strategies including acquiescence or refusal, and fewer 
sophisticated strategies that considered all parties’ perspectives. In a novel task condition, 
participants rank-ordered simple and sophisticated strategies, and gave justifications for their use. 
Rank-ordering did not differentiate the groups. Justifications given by those with ASD for simple 
strategies were more practical and less often character-based than those given by control 
participants; the groups did not differ in the justifications given for sophisticated strategies. The 
possible explanations of these findings and implications for informing current intervention 
programmes are considered.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by difficulties in social 
functioning (see e.g. Travis & Sigman, 1998). Much of this work has focused on ability to empathise. It 
is currently unclear whether emotional empathy, i.e., the ability to resonate emotionally with others, is 
intact in ASD (Dziobek et al., 2008; Grove, Baillie, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Hoekstra, 2014). There is 
more robust evidence of impairment in cognitive empathy, or ability to take others’ perspectives (e.g., 
Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2015), and this is thought to underpin most of the social 
difficulties associated with ASD (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2000). Deficits in cognitive empathy have been 
demonstrated both on simple false-belief tasks (e.g. Happé, 1994; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and also 
on more advanced tasks approximating the demands of everyday interactions (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Loveland, Pearson, Tunali-Kotoski, Ortegon, & 
Gibbs, 2001; Spek, Scholte, & Van Berckelaer–Onnes, 2010).  
Although individuals with ASD typically show impairment on the more advanced measures, there 
have still been instances where performance was similar to control participants, at least in some 
respects (e.g. Scheeren, de Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013). For example, adults with ASD were 
found to infer correctly the mental state of someone with whom they had just interacted (Ponnet, 
Buysse, Roeyers, & De Corte, 2005), and to link complex emotional responses to the correct situation 
(e.g., feigning a positive reaction to an unwanted gift; Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell, & Chapman, 2014). It 
has been suggested that preserved aspects of social performance in ASD may rely on compensatory 
mechanisms such as knowledge acquired through prior social learning and experience (Frith, 2004; 
Hill & Frith, 2003). This has been supported by recent qualitative work, in which participants with ASD 
reported that they often observe how others act in different situations (Carrington, Templeton, & 
Papinczak, 2003; Müller, Schuler, & Yates, 2008). 
Factors such as task demand and the availability of relevant cues are likely to influence performance 
in ASD. For instance, generating problem solutions in everyday situations has been shown to be 
impaired in those with ASD, although when presented with different alternative solutions they were 
able to make appropriate choices (e.g., Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh, & Thoma, 2014). In 
another study (Callenmark, Kjellin, Rönnqvist, & Bölte, 2014), adolescents with ASD did not differ 
from control participants in rating the appropriateness of different social interactions when asked to 
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select from a range of options, but gave less sophisticated verbal rationales when required to justify 
such judgements. Generating rationales may place heavier demands on mentalising ability, whilst 
selecting from options or giving ratings may bypass the need to employ mentalistic processes, so that 
compensatory strategies are sufficient to provide correct approximations. 
The present study aimed to extend our understanding of impaired vs. preserved aspects of everyday 
social functioning by examining both the nature of the strategies that high-functioning adults with ASD 
use to manage everyday social situations, and also their ability to reason about these effectively. This 
study extended previous work by Channon, Collins, Swain, Young, and Fitzpatrick (2012) examining 
how participants high vs. low in self-reported social skill responded to descriptions of interactions 
ending with an awkward question by the main character (the ‘Social Strategy’ task). Those lower in 
skill generated more simple strategies that either complied fully with the requests or refused outright, 
whereas those higher in skill generated more sophisticated strategies involving compromises or 
justifications, and also adopted a more polite emotional tone. Participants did not differ with respect to 
perceived awkwardness. 
In the present study, participants with and without ASD completed the original Social Strategy task 
(referred to here as the ‘application’ condition). It was predicted that those with ASD would perform in 
a similar way to the low skill group in the Channon et al. (2012) study, using fewer sophisticated 
strategies and a less polite emotional tone, but not differing in perceived awkwardness compared to 
the control group. They also completed a novel condition (the ‘reasoning’ condition) which examined 
ability to reason about descriptions of simple and sophisticated strategies to manage the same 
situations. It was expected that, compared to control participants, those with ASD would generate 
fewer rationales referring to the characters on the more demanding task of explaining why people 
might use each strategy, but would not differ on the less demanding task of rank-ordering the 
strategies in terms of social appropriateness. 
2. METHODS 
2.1 Participants and procedure 
Nineteen university students (13 males, 6 females) with ASD were recruited. They were identified by 
advertising within the university for students who had been given a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome 
or autism by a clinician. The diagnosis of ASD was confirmed at the time of the study through the use 
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of a semi-structured interview to assess whether they currently met DSM-5 criteria for ASD. The 
interview was devised by the research team, which included two clinicians with extensive experience 
in the field, who trained the first author to conduct the interviews. Nineteen control participants (13 
males, 6 females) were also recruited by advertisement at the same university. They met the inclusion 
criteria and matched the group with ASD with respect to gender and age. All control participants were 
screened for the presence of symptoms related to ASD using the interview procedure described 
above. 
Inclusion criteria were fluency in English, age between 18 and 30, and a Wechsler Test of Adult 
Reading (WTAR) standard score of 85 or above (Wechsler, 2001). This measure was chosen since it 
has been shown to have good validity and reliability with respect to predicting IQ (e.g., Spreen & 
Strauss, 2006), and is relatively cost- and time-effective compared to other measures of intellectual 
ability. All participants were relatively high-functioning, since they were all students at a leading UK 
university. Participants who reported a history of learning disability or illness or injury involving the 
brain were excluded. 
There was no significant difference between the groups in age (ASD group mean=22.11, SD=3.30, 
control group mean=21.58, SD=3.02), t(36)=.51, p=.611, d=.17, or WTAR standard scores (ASD 
group mean=115.42, SD=8.85, control group mean=111.00, SD=9.82), t(36)=1.46, p=.154, d=.47. 
All participants read an information sheet before taking part in the study, which outlined the rationale 
and procedure of the study. They provided written, informed consent, and were paid at the end for 
their participation. The study was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee and carried out in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki as revised in 2000. 
2.2 The Social Strategy task, ‘application’ condition 
The original Social Strategy task (termed here the ‘application’ condition) (Channon et al., 2012) 
assessed the types of strategies that people use to respond to everyday awkward social situations. It 
consists of 10 vignettes describing social interactions between participants and a main character (see 
Appendix A for the full list of vignettes). Each scenario ends with the character asking the participants 
a question, which involves either offering or requesting a favour, or an opinion. The characters’ 
questions were designed to be socially awkward, since complying would lead to beneficial 
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consequences for the characters, but also to a personal cost for the participants. Participants were 
required to state what they would say in response to the characters’ questions (see Figure 1, 
Question 1), and then to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1=not at all awkward, and 10=very 
awkward) how awkward the situation was (see Figure 1, Question 2). Participants gave their 
responses verbatim, which were written out by the researcher. 
The gender of the characters, the degree of relationship with the participants (i.e., friend, colleague, 
schoolmate, or neighbour) and the type of social context (i.e., family, social, or workplace) were varied 
across scenarios. Two different orders of presentation were used within each group, to control for 
order effects. After reading the task instructions, participants worked through an example scenario. 
Each scenario was shown one at a time in printed form on a separate page of the same booklet. Each 
scenario remained on display when the question was presented to avoid potential confounding effects 
from memory load. 
2.3 Scoring of the ‘application’ condition 
2.3.1 Social strategies 
Participants’ verbal responses to the characters’ questions were categorised as either simple or 
sophisticated, on the basis of the extent to which they took into account both the participants’ and the 
characters’ interests.  
Simple 
Simple strategies consisted of short responses that met only either the characters’ or the participants’ 
wishes. They included two different types of responses: ‘acquiescence’ or ‘refusal’. Acquiescence 
referred to responses in which participants fully agreed without qualifying their compliance, whereas 
refusal referred to responses in which participants refused outright to comply, without providing a 
justification (see Figure 1 for examples of each type of strategy). 
Sophisticated 
Sophisticated strategies comprised responses that showed consideration for both the participants’ 
and the characters’ perspectives. These responses negotiated a solution that limited the personal 
sacrifice of the participants, but also took into account the characters’ expectations. They included 
four different types of responses. ‘Qualification with excuse’ and ‘justification with excuse’ respectively 
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referred to responses in which participants qualified their compliance or justified their refusal on the 
basis of an excuse that interpreted the undesirable aspects of the situation in a more favourable light, 
or that mentioned the participants’ inability to comply. ‘Qualification with factual feedback’ and 
‘justification with factual feedback’ respectively referred to responses in which participants qualified 
their compliance or justified their refusal by mentioning some or all of the undesirable aspects of the 
situation (see Figure 1 for examples of each type of strategy).  
Participants’ responses were scored by a rater who was not blind to group membership, and by a 
second, blind independent rater. There was an inter-rater agreement rate of 91.39 %; all 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. All scores were added across scenarios and 
converted into percentages. 
2.3.2 Emotional tone 
In order to examine the manner in which participants expressed their responses, the emotional tone 
of the written responses was rated negative, neutral or positive. Each response was assigned a score 
of 1 when the emotional tone was judged to be negative (blunt or denigratory responses); a score of 2 
when no particular emotional tone was identified (neutral responses); or a score of 3 when the 
emotional tone was judged to be positive (polite or sympathetic responses). Across the ten scenarios 
this gave each participant a score ranging from 10 to 30; these were then converted into percentages, 
with higher scores indicating a more positive emotional tone. There was an inter-rater agreement rate 
of 93.89%; all disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
2.3.3 Awkwardness ratings 
Awkwardness ratings were added and averaged across scenarios. 
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Example scenario 
Your cousin likes to come and stay with you. She is good company, but when she visits she 
expects you to pay to take her out to expensive places. She asks: “Can I come and visit you next 
weekend?” 
Question 1: What would you say in this situation? 
Examples of simple strategies: 
Acquiescence: “Ok” 
Refusal: “No, sorry” 
Examples of sophisticated strategies: 
Qualification with excuse: “Of course, but I probably won't have much time to take you to 
places, because I'll be busy from work”  
Qualification with factual feedback: “I’d like to see you, but I'm slightly broke at the moment, so 
I think that we are going to have to look after saving money when you come here - I hope you 
don't mind” 
Justification with excuse: “I'm sorry, but I'm really busy next weekend, it doesn't look like I'm 
going to have enough time” 
Justification with factual feedback: “I'd love for you to come, but unfortunately I can't afford to 
host you at the moment - I don’t have enough money” 
Question 2: On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represents “not at all awkward” and 10 
represents “very awkward”, how awkward would you say this situation is? 
Figure 1. Example Scenario and Questions from the ‘Application’ Condition of the Social Strategy 
Task 
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2.4 Social Strategy task, ‘reasoning’ condition 
This novel condition of the Social Strategy task was designed to examine how participants judged and 
reasoned about different ways to deal with the same awkward situations used in the ‘application’ 
condition. Participants were first presented with an example scenario, along with a list of descriptions 
of six response strategies (see Figure 2). For each strategy description (e.g., ‘to agree’), they were 
asked to generate an example of what people might say if they chose it, to ensure that they 
understood each of the strategy labels. They were then shown practical examples of each type of 
strategy.  
Once they had completed the example, participants were presented with each of the ten original 
scenarios and asked to rank-order the descriptions of the six different types of response strategies, 
from the most to the least appropriate (see Figure 2, Question a), and to explain why people might 
choose each type of response strategy for each scenario (see Figure 2, Question b). They were 
instructed to base their responses on how most people would answer, to encourage them to reflect on 
what is generally appropriate rather than to consider only their personal preferences.  
2.5 Scoring of the ‘reasoning’ condition 
2.5.1 Strategy rank-ordering 
The number of times each strategy was selected as the best was added across scenarios and 
converted into percentages. 
2.5.2 Rationales 
The rationales provided by participants to explain why people might use each type of strategy were 
categorised as practical (P) or character-based (CB) (see Figure 2 for examples of each type of 
rationale). Practical rationales referred to aspects of the situation relating to practical resources, such 
as time or money. Character-based rationales referred to the story characters’ expectations, thoughts 
or feelings. Responses could score for only one of the two categories; if both were met, then the best 
answer would be taken, and participants’ rationales would score in the CB category. There was an 
inter-rater agreement rate of 92.04%; all disagreements were resolved through discussion. All scores 
were added across scenarios and converted into percentages. 
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Example scenario 
Your cousin likes to come and stay with you. She is good company, but when she visits she expects you 
to pay to take her out to expensive places. She asks: “Can I come and visit you next weekend?” 
Question a: Please rank-order the following types of answers to the character’s question from the 
most to the least appropriate: 
a) To agree  
b) To suggest a compromise based on a polite excuse  
c) To suggest a compromise based on your honest opinion about the situation  
d) To refuse based on a polite excuse 
e) To refuse based on your honest opinion about the situation  
f) To refuse 
Question b: “Why might people choose a)?”   
                     “Why might people choose b)”? 
                     “Why might people choose ..)? 
Examples of rationales: 
E.g., why might people choose to compromise based on a polite excuse? 
Practical: “If they want to save at least some money” / “They are worried about taking the time and 
spending money on something they don't really need” 
Character-based: “They don't want to get into a fight with a family member” / “They don’t want to risk 
upsetting someone they care about” 
Figure 2. Example Scenario and Questions from the ‘Reasoning’ Condition of the Social Strategy 
Task 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Data analysis 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each measure are shown in Table 1 for the ‘application’ 
condition, and in Table 2 for the ‘reasoning’ condition. A significance level of p<.05 (two-tailed) was 
adopted throughout.  
3.2 Social Strategy task, ‘application’ condition  
3.2.1 Type of strategy usage 
The two groups were compared on their usage of simple and sophisticated strategies. The group with 
ASD was found to use a significantly lower percentage of sophisticated strategies compared to the 
control group, t(36)=5.17, p<.001, d=1.68. Whilst the group with ASD used simple strategies almost 
half of the time, sophisticated strategies accounted for the majority of the responses given by the 
control group.  
3.2.2 Emotional tone 
The two groups were compared on the emotional tone of their responses. The group with ASD was 
found to score significantly lower overall for emotional tone than the control group, t(36)=4.38, p<.001, 
d=1.42. 
 
Table 1 
Mean scores and standard deviations for the ‘application’ condition of the Social Strategy task. 
 
Variable 
Group with ASD Control group 
Mean  SD Mean   SD 
Social strategies (%)     
   Simple  47.37  23.53 14.74  14.29 
   Sophisticated  52.63  23.53 85.26  14.29 
Emotional tone (%) 59.65  11.96 75.79  10.71 
Perceived awkwardness (%) 41.47  15.25 45.74       8.79 
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3.2.3 Perceived awkwardness  
The two groups were compared on their ratings of perceived awkwardness. There was no significant 
difference between groups in their ratings, t(36)=1.06, p=.298, d=.34. 
3.3 Social Strategy task, ‘reasoning’ condition 
3.3.1 Type of strategy rank-ordering 
The two groups were compared on their rank-ordering of simple and sophisticated strategies as the 
most appropriate. There was no significant difference between groups in the frequency of rank-
ordering sophisticated strategies as the most appropriate, t(36)=.99, p=.328, d=.32. Both groups 
tended to rank-order sophisticated strategies as the most appropriate overall.   
3.3.2 Types of rationales  
The two groups were compared on the types of verbal rationales they generated to explain why 
people might use simple and sophisticated strategies. A repeated-measure 2x2 ANOVA (group by 
type of strategy) was conducted to examine the percentage of rationales classified as practical vs. 
character-based. The main effect of type of strategy was not significant, F(1,36)=1.76, p=.193. There 
were a significant main effect of group, F(1,36)=10.10, p=.003, and a significant group by type of 
strategy interaction, F(1,36)=6.33, p=.016. Post-hoc t-tests using a corrected significance level 
(.5/2=.025) showed that the group with ASD provided a significantly lower percentage of character-
based rationales to justify the use of simple strategies, t(36)=4.14, p<.001, d=1.34; there was no 
significant difference between groups in percentage of character-based rationales to justify the use of 
sophisticated strategies, t(36)=1.48, p=.149, d=.48. 
3.3.3 Effect of WTAR standard scores and gender 
All the analyses described in this section were repeated with participants’ WTAR standard scores and 
gender as covariates, to control for the influence of these variables on the results. Inclusion of these 
factors did not alter the pattern of findings. 
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Table 2 
Mean scores and standard deviations for the ‘reasoning’ condition of the Social Strategy task. 
 
Variable 
Group with ASD Control group 
Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Type of strategy  
rank-ordering (%) 
    
   Simple  31.05  21.83 25.26  13.07 
   Sophisticated  68.95  21.83 74.74  13.07 
Character-based  
rationales (%) 
     
   Simple  46.84  14.74 66.58   14.63 
   Sophisticated  56.18  15.01 63.68   16.32 
Practical  
rationales (%) 
     
   Simple  53.16  14.74 33.42   14.63 
   Sophisticated  43.82  15.01 36.32   16.32 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this study, participants with ASD and a control group performed two conditions of the Social 
Strategy task (Channon et al., 2012): ‘application’ and ‘reasoning’. The ‘application’ condition 
examined how they responded to everyday awkward scenarios, whereas the ‘reasoning’ condition 
explored how they reasoned about different types of strategies. 
A key finding in the ‘application’ condition was that, as expected, the group with ASD generated fewer 
sophisticated strategies to respond to the awkward questions and were less courteous in emotional 
tone. With respect to perceived awkwardness, it could be argued that people with ASD should 
experience higher levels since they may feel less capable of dealing with social situations, or, 
alternatively, that they should experience lower levels since their awareness of the nuances 
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characterising the social situations may be reduced. The similar awkwardness ratings provided by the 
two groups suggested that those with ASD did not differ in their perceptions of this. 
These findings replicate and extend those of Channon et al. (2012), who showed that people with low 
levels of self-reported social skill generated fewer sophisticated strategies with a less positive 
emotional tone than participants with high levels of self-reported social skill. This suggests that the 
Social Strategy task is potentially a sensitive tool to identify quantitative and qualitative differences in 
performance both in those low vs. high in self-reported social skill and also in those with vs. without 
ASD. 
With respect to the ‘reasoning’ condition of the current study, both groups rank-ordered sophisticated 
strategies above simple strategies. This suggested that the group with ASD recognised these as the 
most skilled ways to deal with the characters’ awkward questions, despite having generated fewer of 
them in the ‘application’ condition. By contrast, control participants were able not only to recognise the 
appropriateness of sophisticated strategies when asked to rank-order them, but also to generate more 
sophisticated strategies in the ‘application’ condition. 
The finding that those with ASD did not differ from control participants in their awkwardness ratings in 
the ‘application’ condition or in their rank-ordering of strategies in the ‘reasoning’ condition is 
consistent with previous evidence that they can perform similarly to control participants on less 
demanding tasks (e.g., Channon et al., 2014). For instance, Callenmark et al. (2014) found that 
adolescents with ASD could evaluate the appropriateness of different social behaviours using a 
multiple-choice answering format, but provided rationales of poorer quality compared to control 
participants when required to justify their judgements. The authors suggested that that the use of a 
multiple-choice format may have reduced the task demands, and thus accounted for intact 
performance by the group with ASD. 
On the more demanding task of generating rationales for using different strategies, the picture of 
findings is more complex, since the groups were similar on the sophisticated strategies but not on the 
simple ones. Whilst the control group generated more reasons involving the characters to justify the 
use of simple strategies, the group with ASD made more references to the practical aspects of the 
situations. Both groups, however, gave similar numbers of practical and character-based rationales 
for the sophisticated strategies, suggesting that they reasoned about these in similar ways. The 
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reason for this apparent discrepancy is unclear, but it is conceivable that the provision of 
sophisticated strategy descriptions served to cue participants to consider compromises or 
justifications for refusals, thereby drawing to their attention the need to take into account the 
characters’ viewpoints as well as their own. Thus, those with ASD appeared to lack either ability or 
inclination to consider the characters spontaneously in their reasoning, unless cued to do so. 
One limitation of the present study was the relatively small sample size, although many previous 
studies have used similar number of participants (e.g., Castelli, 2005, with respect to emotion 
recognition; Zalla et al., 2009, with respect to faux pas recognition). When sample sizes are limited, it 
is important to examine effect sizes (Baer & Ahern, 1993; Cohen, 1992). In the current experiment, 
these were always relatively large (d always > 1, Cohen, 1992), suggesting that the task might still be 
sensitive enough to detect important group differences. Another possible limitation concerns the use 
of scenario-based measures. These have many strengths; for instance, since these describe real-life-
type situations, they have higher ecological validity than abstract laboratory measures, whilst allowing 
the exploration of participants’ thought processes in a more rigorous way than observational 
experiments. However, they still lack the high degree of experimental control associated with 
traditional laboratory tasks, and are likely to be less interpersonally stimulating than naturally-
occurring situations. Future studies might overcome these limitations through the usage of virtual 
reality paradigms or role-plays. Finally, diagnosis of ASD was confirmed through the use of a semi-
structured interview that has not been validated externally. However, it was also the case that all 
participants had already been diagnosed at an earlier age as having ASD. Although we could have 
chosen a standardised instrument such as the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord 
et al., 1989), our past experience using this instrument suggested it to be rather limited and somewhat 
inappropriate with high-functioning adults; moreover, it does not relate directly to DSM criteria. 
Social models of ASD 
Various social explanations including emotional empathy, cognitive empathy and social knowledge 
might explain the current findings. Emotional empathy has been linked with socially sensitive 
behaviour (Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010; Lockwood, Seara-Cardoso, & Viding, 2014). 
However, impaired emotional empathy seems an implausible explanation in the light of previous 
literature describing impaired cognitive empathy with preserved emotional empathy in ASD (e.g., 
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Dziobek et al., 2008), although some people with ASD may have both impaired cognitive and 
emotional empathy (Grove et al., 2014). A more plausible explanation is that those with ASD may 
have struggled to take into account the characters’ perspectives due to impaired cognitive empathy 
(Frith, 2001). With respect to the ‘application’ condition, this might have led to a decreased propensity 
to generate strategies that considered both the participants’ and the characters’ interests. Impaired 
cognitive empathy might also explain why those with ASD provided fewer rationales considering the 
characters in the ‘reasoning’ condition for simple strategies, focusing more on the practical 
advantages. For instance, acquiescence was often seen as an efficient method of escaping the 
awkward situations (e.g., “Sometimes it’s just easier to say yes”), or deceiving the characters asking 
for favours (e.g., “You can say yes now, but not actually do it in the end”). In contrast, the control 
group tended to refer to the impact on the characters (e.g., “The cousin is family, and they care about 
keeping a good relationship with them”). For refusals, where declining outright to comply with 
awkward requests clearly favours participants’ interests, those with ASD again referred more 
frequently to the practical advantages of refusing (e.g., “You will save money if you say no”), whilst 
control participants focused more often on the characters, for instance by highlighting circumstances 
where the relationship would not suffer (e.g., “If they are close enough to their cousin to know that she 
will not be offended”). 
Reliance on compensatory mechanisms such as social knowledge, acquired through learning and 
observation, may also have contributed to the current findings. This may be instrumental in helping 
people with ASD to extrapolate the rules underlying appropriate social conduct (Carrington et al., 
2003; Müller et al., 2008), and teaching them how to circumvent their difficulties and find solutions to 
social problems (Bowler, 1992; Senju, 2012). Reliance on compensatory social knowledge may have 
aided those with ASD with awkwardness ratings and rank-ordering, both of which are less demanding 
than generating free verbal responses. 
Could reliance on social knowledge also explain why those with ASD generated similar numbers of 
character-based rationales for sophisticated but not for simple strategies? Impaired perspective-taking 
may have made practical rationales easier overall to access for them compared to character-based 
ones. However, the requirement to reflect on why people might choose compromises or justifications 
may have encouraged them to consider the characters’ perspectives, in contrast with the simple 
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strategies which did not contain such cues. It might in fact be hard to imagine why someone would 
make the effort to offer a compromise or justification on the basis of the practical aspects of the 
situations alone, prompting them to think about alternative explanations. This is consistent with 
evidence that people with high-functioning ASD can reason about others if cued to do so (Begeer, 
Rieffe, Terwogt, & Stockmann, 2003). 
Non-social models of ASD 
Individuals with ASD have been found to be impaired on a range of tests measuring executive 
function (Hill, 2004), and other evidence has suggested a cognitive style whereby information tends to 
be processed in a piecemeal manner, focusing on details rather than wholes (‘weak central 
coherence’) (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2001). Both impaired executive function and weak central 
coherence have possible implications for social functioning, perhaps by influencing ability to plan, shift 
or inhibit behaviours or to generate appropriate responses according to the social context (Channon, 
Charman, Heap, Crawford, & Rios, 2001; McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Russell, Saltmarsh, 
& Hill, 1999). With respect to the current study, impaired executive function may have hindered ability 
to inhibit the generation of socially inappropriate strategies, or to predict and evaluate the 
consequences of their usage. Weak central coherence may have influenced capacity to integrate the 
details of all the relevant scenario information.  
The different formats of the questions posed in the ‘application’ and ‘reasoning’ conditions may have 
created additional cognitive demands to switch perspectives through the use of second-person 
questions in the ‘application’ condition (e.g., “what would you say in this situation?”), and third-person 
questions in the ‘reasoning condition’ (e.g., “why might people choose…?”). Moreover, the 
descriptions of the strategies were relatively abstract, meaning that participants had to imagine what 
people might actually say in the situations. Previous evidence has suggested that people with ASD 
show reduced ability to allocate their mental resources flexibly to guide thoughts and actions 
(Solomon, Ozonoff, Cummings, & Carter, 2008). 
The relationship between non-social processes and social processes remains unclear, and it is 
beyond the scope of this study to attempt to disentangle their relative contributions to the deficits 
associated with ASD. Some researchers have argued that theory of mind is likely to emerge within a 
broader context of information processing and reasoning, meaning that social deficits might reflect 
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part of a more general impairment in cognition in ASD (e.g., Russell, 1997; Zelazo & Frye, 1997). 
Other, ‘domain-specific’ theories, hold that social and non-social processes are separable, and that 
theory of mind is likely to be the predominant explanation for the social impairments associated with 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987). Social and non-social antecedents are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and might synergise and intertwine in a variety of ways in different individuals in 
the development of ASD. 
 Another consideration is that Individuals with ASD might lack motivation to engage in socially 
appropriate behaviour because they find it less intrinsically rewarding than neurotypical people 
(Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). Any reward deficits may be specific to social 
stimuli or reflect a general reward processing deficit in ASD (Dichter et al., 2012). Recent evidence 
showing diminished sensitivity to both social and non-social rewards in ASD suggests a possible 
general deficit, but more work is needed to examine these issues in everyday situations. Overall, ASD 
embraces a wide range of symptomatology and it is unlikely that one explanatory model will fit all; the 
challenge for the future is to map the extent to which different contributory factors can be linked to 
different presentations in subsets of individuals with ASD. 
Clinical implications 
Although difficulties associated with ASD appear in childhood, diagnosis is often not made until later 
in life, especially for higher-functioning people with less obvious impairments (Howlin, 2006). Since 
diagnosis of ASD is based on developmental history, assessing adults can be a complex task. They 
often struggle to recall detailed information about early development, and informants are not always 
available (Barnard, Harvey, Prior, & Potter, 2001). Moreover, since most available diagnostic tools 
were designed for children, many of their activities (e.g., playing with dolls in the ADOS; Lord et al., 
1989) are unsuitable for adults. The current findings suggest that everyday life type-tasks such as the 
present one might be sensitive tools to profile individuals’ strengths and weaknesses in social 
processing, thereby aiding the diagnostic process. This could in turn guide the development of 
intervention strategies. For instance, the present scenarios could be used to target people's ability to 
generate socially appropriate responses that consider both their own and others’ viewpoints, and to 
anticipate the implications of using different responses, such as the recipients’ likely reactions. Since 
generalisability of skills training across different situations has been often found difficult to achieve 
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(Howlin & Yates, 1999), teaching the principles underpinning socially skilled responses and practising 
these across different scenario contexts might enhance the generalisability to real-life environments. 
The present task could also be refined to exploit the effect of cuing to enhance more sophisticated 
social skills in higher-functioning individuals. For instance, encouraging people to consider different 
alternative responses (e.g., through reading descriptions of these) before generating their own might 
improve their ability to respond in more socially appropriate ways. This may provide a stepping stone 
to real-life social interactions, where decisions need to be taken under time pressure, and there is less 
scope for providing effective cues compared to offline tasks such as the present one, potentially 
limiting generalisability. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this study found that, compared to neurotypical people, those with ASD used fewer 
sophisticated strategies and a harsher emotional tone to respond to everyday awkward scenarios. 
They generated fewer character-based rationales when asked to reason about the use of simple 
strategies, but did not differ from control participants in their rationales for sophisticated strategies, or 
in their ability to rank-order them. Scenario-based measures such as the Social Strategy task may 
contribute to improving current understanding of how people with ASD respond to and reason about 
everyday social situations. This has potential implications for bridging the gap between teaching 
abstract social skills and helping them to navigate the social world in practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. You have just moved house. A new neighbour offers to assemble some shelves for you. He does 
not do a very good job, as he scratches the new paintwork. He asks: “Would you like me to 
assemble your desk now?” 
2. Your cousin likes to come and stay with you. She is good company, but when she visits she 
expects you to pay to take her out to expensive places. She asks: “Can I come and visit you next 
weekend?” 
3. Your colleague is being considered for an important promotion, and gives a talk to the company. It 
is too long, and he makes some bad jokes where nobody laughs. He asks: “Do you think my talk 
went well?” 
4. You friend knits you a jumper for Christmas. The shape is rather uneven and the style is not 
flattering. She asks: “Will you wear the jumper when we go carol singing later?” 
5. On the train home after a long day, you bump into an old schoolmate. She always only talks about 
herself and moans a lot. She asks: “Would you like to come over for dinner next week?” 
6. You meet up with your brother. You saw him recently with his new girlfriend. Each time you or your 
friends tried to talk to her, she ignored you and talked only to your brother. He asks: “Did you get 
on well with my girlfriend?” 
7. You are taking an evening course in French. A woman who is on the same course struggles with 
the material. She often asks you for extra help. Now she asks: “Will you help me with my essay?” 
8. A friend who recently took art classes has painted a series of self-portraits. They are very poorly 
painted. He asks: “Would you like a painting for your living room?” 
9. Your brother decides to organise a big party for your parents’ golden wedding anniversary. You are 
very busy at work, with important deadlines to meet. He asks: “Will you send out all the 
invitations?” 
10. Your friend wants to become a singer, and she takes part in a singing competition. Her singing is 
badly out of tune. She asks: “Do you think I sang well?” 
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